Down 45%, but not for the month: reading the new numbers on Russian refining
Twenty days of near-daily Ukrainian drone strikes have cut Russia's daily crude processing by about 45%, according to two industry sources cited by Reuters. It is the first aggregate picture of what the campaign is doing to output, rather than another report of a fire at a single plant. But the…
Baltic Security Monitor | Material OSINT Update
Security Watch cycle: 18 November 2026, 20:00 EET · Window: 14:00–20:00 · Lookback up to 24 hours
Twenty days of near-daily Ukrainian drone strikes have cut Russia's daily crude processing by about 45%, according to two industry sources cited by Reuters. It is the first aggregate picture of what the campaign is doing to output, rather than another report of a fire at a single plant. But the figure compares two points in time. It is not a collapse across the whole month.
Russian refining: from 700,000 to 400,000 tonnes a day
MATERIAL UPDATE · MODERATE · Energy infrastructure / War economy
According to two industry sources cited by Reuters, near-daily drone strikes over the past 20 days have pushed crude processing at Russian refineries down to around 400,000 tonnes a day, or roughly 3 million barrels. At the end of October it was above 700,000 tonnes.
Operations have been disrupted or halted at 15 of Russia's 35 major refineries, up from nine in the middle of last week. The plants named include Ryazan, Yaroslavl and Kirishi, along with refineries in the Volga region. Their combined nominal capacity is about 500,000 tonnes a day, roughly 54% of Russia's estimated primary capacity of 930,000 tonnes. That is the capacity of plants that suffered disruption, not capacity destroyed or permanently offline.
November's average still sits above 500,000 tonnes a day, about 5–10% below September and October. The 45% drop measures the late-October peak against the current low, not the monthly result.
Strikes resumed on 30 October after a two-week pause that followed Donald Trump's announcement of an "energy ceasefire" on 11 October, which neither side formally acknowledged. Russian defence ministry data showed this week brought the largest overnight drone attack on Russia since 2022. Russia's energy ministry did not respond to Reuters.
Separately, Ukraine's General Staff said its strike on the Ilsky refinery overnight on 16 November hit three primary processing units and the gasoline production complex. Damage is still being assessed.
What changed
BSM has so far tracked strikes plant by plant. This is the first aggregate estimate of how the campaign is affecting production as a whole.
BSM analysis
The numbers say two things at once. Ukraine has, for the first time, briefly knocked out close to half of Russia's refining throughput simultaneously. Yet the Russian system also recovers quickly: during the October pause it climbed back above 700,000 tonnes in two weeks. The real question is not how deep the dip goes but whether repairs can keep pace with the strikes.
The economic effect is so far limited. Crude that is not refined can be exported, and in October Urals and ESPO traded above $100 a barrel, supporting Moscow's revenues. The weak spot remains the domestic fuel market: in August Russia already imported a record 172,000 tonnes of oil products, mostly gasoline.
For the Baltic region there is a direct angle. Kirishi in the Leningrad region, one of Russia's largest refineries, is among the affected plants, and its output is exported through Gulf of Finland ports. Disruption there can change the volume and mix of tanker traffic in the Gulf, including the shadow-fleet vessels that Estonia and Finland monitor. The broader point is resilience: an economy that can repair refineries this fast under fire will remain a capable adversary for NATO's northeastern flank whatever happens to the war.
🟡 The link between lower refining and fuel supplies to the Russian military has not been measured.
🟡 Establishing a sustained decline requires further data on refinery utilisation, seaborne product flows, stocks and actual fuel output. The extent of damage and the length of outages at individual units, including Ilsky and Afipsky, have not been independently confirmed.
Likely implications
Expect more fuel imports, accelerated repairs and extended restrictions on product exports. The outcome will depend on how fast Russia can restore equipment and how long Ukraine sustains the campaign.
WATCH: continuing checks
🟡 Ukraine and Finland, joint production. The 17 November memorandum has been officially confirmed by the Ukrainian government. It does not yet name a working plant, production volumes or completed deliveries.
🟡 IAEA. Ukraine objects to the possible appointment of a Russian official to a senior post at the agency. No appointment has been made, and no change to safety at the Zaporizhzhia plant has been confirmed.
🟡 Moldova. Forensic work on the seven airspace violations continues. (Full analysis: 14:00 edition, 18 November.)
Unchanged: the Kerch bridge, the Threod case with KAPO and VDD, the closure of the Estonian-Russian border from 1 December, the BETUL 8 and Sulina maritime incidents, the Zaporizhzhia plant, Starshield, the Kyiv bridges, drone forensics in Baltic airspace, the Russian vessel in the Gulf of Finland, investigations in Poland, measures in Klaipėda and Rzeszów, and implementation of Ukraine Defence Contact Group decisions.
Bottom line
The most important part of the Reuters numbers is not the 45%. It is the gap between 400,000 tonnes at the low point and more than 500,000 on average across the month. That gap is where the real contest plays out: the speed of Ukrainian strikes against the speed of Russian repairs. Neither side has won it yet.
Baltic Security Monitor (osint-baltic.com) — an analytical publication on security across NATO's northeastern flank.
Based on an automated open-source monitoring cycle with independent verification.