Ten Targets, a Few Hundred Euros: KAPO Puts a Number on the Threat to Estonia's Defence Industry

Two days after the foiled arson at Threod Systems, Estonia's counterintelligence chief has given the first public sense of scale: Russia is currently targeting around ten Estonian defence companies. That means ten targets of interest, not ten attacks. Over the years KAPO has identified more than…

Share
Ten Targets, a Few Hundred Euros: KAPO Puts a Number on the Threat to Estonia's Defence Industry

Baltic Security Monitor | Material Update · MODERATE
Security Watch: 16 November 2026, 14:00 EET


Two days after the foiled arson at Threod Systems, Estonia's counterintelligence chief has given the first public sense of scale: Russia is currently targeting around ten Estonian defence companies. That means ten targets of interest, not ten attacks. Over the years KAPO has identified more than 50 people who agreed to work for Russian intelligence — some of the perpetrators were paid just a few hundred euros.


What Palloson said

In an interview with ERR on 16 November, Margo Palloson, Director General of Estonia's Internal Security Service (KAPO), said Russia is currently targeting around ten companies in the country's defence industry. He did not name them.

Key points from the interview:

  • KAPO had substantial advance intelligence on the threat to Threod Systems. Latvia supplied a couple of pieces of the puzzle, and KAPO swaps threat information with European services almost daily.
  • Threod's own security was of a very high standard. The attackers were stopped by a local security guard, not a KAPO officer. No one was hurt, the company suffered no significant damage, and production and deliveries were unaffected.
  • Many such incidents never become public, because KAPO briefs defence firms and tries to stop attacks early.
  • Over the years the service has identified more than 50 individuals who agreed to cooperate with Russian intelligence.
  • Recruitment runs through criminal networks, social media, socio-economically vulnerable people, and pressure on those who travel to Russia. Some perpetrators were paid only a few hundred euros.
  • Russia may act recklessly; some incidents elsewhere in Europe could have caused significant loss of life.

BSM analysis: "around ten" reframes the whole story. Until now two attacks were public: the successful arson at Milrem Robotics in August and the foiled attempt on Threod on 14 November. Those now look like the visible edge of a wider target map. Estonia's defence sector is small, so ten firms is a meaningful share of it — above all the companies building drones and robotic systems for Ukraine. The economics matter too. Saboteurs hired for a few hundred euros are close to infinitely replaceable, which is why arrests alone do not remove the threat.

The new question: a Latvian corridor

The sharpest part of the interview concerns the border. Palloson said closing the land crossings with Russia would certainly help mitigate Estonia's security risks — but it would leave Latvia as the only route. He said he hoped Latvia would also take sufficient measures.

That line lands hard after the Threod case, where all eight detainees are Latvian citizens and the explosive devices were seized at Latvian addresses. By closing its own border, Tallinn shifts part of the load onto its neighbour. Palloson declined to share what KAPO knows about the Latvian suspects, saying it still needs verification.

Wider context

Palloson has been describing a shift in tactics for weeks. At the end of September, after the Milrem attack, he told ETV that Russia's actions across Europe were systematic and increasingly aimed at firms that develop or supply weapons for Ukraine. In an October interview with Foreign Policy he said Estonia had arrested 20 people recruited during trips to Russia since 2025, and that there can be up to seven layers of intermediaries between a saboteur and Moscow.

Still unverified

  • Which companies are under threat.
  • How many have faced concrete sabotage attempts, and how far those plans progressed.
  • Details on the Latvian suspects, storage sites and meeting places.
  • Whether Latvia will tighten its own border with Russia.

Bottom line

The first two attacks looked like separate incidents. KAPO is now describing a system: ten targets, more than fifty recruits over the years, saboteurs for a few hundred euros. Protecting Estonia's defence industry is no longer about guarding individual buildings. It is a question for the Baltic states' shared border.

A door is only closed when every door is closed.


Baltic Security Monitor (osint-baltic.com) — an analytical publication on security along NATO's northeastern flank.
Assessments are produced by an automated open-source monitoring system, with independent fact verification.

Read more

Десять мішеней і ціна в кілька сотень євро: KAPO оцінила масштаб загрози оборонці Естонії

Десять мішеней і ціна в кілька сотень євро: KAPO оцінила масштаб загрози оборонці Естонії

Після зірваного підпалу Threod Systems керівник естонської контррозвідки вперше назвав масштаб: Росія зараз цілиться приблизно в десять оборонних компаній Естонії. Йдеться не про десять атак, а про десять об'єктів інтересу російських спецслужб. За роки роботи KAPO виявила понад 50 людей, які…

By Moderator
Вісім затриманих, дев'ять адрес: латвійський слід диверсії проти Threod

Вісім затриманих, дев'ять адрес: латвійський слід диверсії проти Threod

Спроба підпалу естонського виробника дронів Threod Systems отримала латвійський вимір. Служба державної безпеки Латвії (VDD) підтвердила, що саме вона передала естонським колегам попередження про загрозу, а після затримання провела процесуальні дії на дев'яти адресах у Латвії. Там вилучено…

By Moderator